certiorari to the
Argued November 1, 2005--Decided February 21, No. 04-1084. 2006
Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in response to Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, where, in upholding a generally
applicable law that burdened the sacramental use of peyote, this Court held
that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not require judges to
engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by
facially constitutional laws, id., at 883-890. Among other things,
RFRA prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person's
exercise of religion, "even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability," 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-1(a), except when the
Government can "demonstrat[e] that application of the burden to the person
(1) [furthers] a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that ... interest," §2000bb-1(b).
Members
of respondent church (UDV) receive communion by drinking hoasca, a tea
brewed from plants unique to the Amazon Rainforest that contains DMT, a
hallucinogen regulated under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, see
21 U. S. C. §812(c), Schedule I(c). After U. S. Customs
inspectors seized a hoasca shipment to the American UDV and threatened
prosecution, the UDV filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging, inter alia, that applying the Controlled Substances Act to
the UDV's sacramental hoasca use violates RFRA. At a hearing on the
UDV's preliminary injunction motion, the Government conceded that the
challenged application would substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion,
but argued that this burden did not violate RFRA because applying the
Controlled Substances Act was the least restrictive means of advancing three
compelling governmental interests: protecting UDV members' health and safety,
preventing the diversion of hoasca from the church to recreational
users, and complying with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. The District Court granted relief, concluding that, because the
parties' evidence on health risks and diversion was equally balanced, the
Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the
substantial burden on the UDV. The court also held that the 1971 Convention
does not apply to hoasca. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The
courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to
demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in
barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca. Pp. 6-19.
1. This
Court rejects the Government's argument that evidentiary equipoise as to
potential harm and diversion is an insufficient basis for a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act. Given that the
Government conceded the UDV's prima facie RFRA
2. Also
rejected is the Government's central submission that, because it has a
compelling interest in the uniform application of the Controlled
Substances Act, no exception to the DMT ban can be made to accommodate the UDV.
The Government argues, inter alia, that the Act's description of
Schedule I substances as having "a high potential for abuse,"
"no currently accepted medical use," and "a lack of accepted safety
for use ... under medical supervision," 21 U. S. C. §812(b)(1),
by itself precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions, and that
the Act's "closed" regulatory system, which prohibits all use of
controlled substances except as the Act itself authorizes, see Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U. S. ___, ___, cannot function properly if subjected to
judicial exemptions. Pp. 8-16.
(a) RFRA
and its strict scrutiny test contemplate an inquiry more focused than the
Government's categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate
that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the
challenged law "to the person"--the particular claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. 42 U. S. C.
§2000bb-1(b). Section 2000bb(b)(1) expressly adopted the compelling interest
test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374
, and
(b) Under
RFRA's more focused inquiry, the Government's mere invocation of the general
characteristics of Schedule I substances cannot carry the day. Although
Schedule I substances such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous, see, e.g.,
Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162, there is no indication that
Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use
at issue. That question was litigated below. Before the District Court
found that the Government had not carried its burden of showing a compelling
interest in preventing such harm, the court noted that it could not ignore the
congressional classification and findings. But Congress' determination that DMT
should be listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categorical answer
that relieves the Government of the obligation to shoulder its RFRA burden. The
Controlled Substances Act's authorization to the Attorney General to
"waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors,
or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and
safety," 21 U. S. C. §822(d), reinforces that Congress' findings
with respect to Schedule I substances should not carry the determinative
weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to them. Indeed,
despite the fact that everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca
applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, another Schedule I
substance, both the Executive and Congress have decreed an exception from the
Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote, see 21
CFR §1307.31; 42 U. S. C. §1996a(b)(1). If such use
(c) The
peyote exception also fatally undermines the Government's broader contention
that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that
admits of no exceptions under RFRA. The peyote exception has been in place
since the Controlled Substances Act's outset, and there is no evidence that it
has undercut the Government's ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by
non-Indians. The Government's reliance on pre-Smith cases asserting a
need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions under the Free
Exercise Clause is unavailing. Those cases did not embrace the notion that a
general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious
exercise, but instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why the
denied exemptions could not be accommodated. See, e.g.,
3. The
Government argues unpersuasively that it has a compelling interest in complying
with the 1971 U. N. Convention. While this Court does not agree with the
District Court that the Convention does not cover hoasca, that does
not automatically mean that the Government has demonstrated a compelling
interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act, which implements the
Convention, to the UDV's sacramental use. At this stage, it suffices that the
Government did not submit any evidence addressing the international
consequences of granting the UDV an exemption, but simply relied on two
affidavits by State Department officials attesting to the general (and
undoubted) importance of honoring international obligations and maintaining the
United States' leadership in the international war on drugs. Under RFRA,
invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough. Pp. 16-18.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined,
except Alito, J., who took
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
et al., PETITIONERS v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA
BENEFICENTE UNIAO DO VEGETAL et al.
on writ of certiorari to the
[February 21, 2006]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest receives communion by
drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to the region, that
contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the
Federal Government. The Government concedes that this practice is a sincere
exercise of religion, but nonetheless sought to prohibit the small American
branch of the sect from engaging in the practice, on the ground that the
Controlled Substances Act bars all use of the hallucinogen. The sect sued to
block enforcement against it of the ban on the sacramental tea, and moved for a
preliminary injunction.
It
relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which prohibits the
Federal Government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion,
unless the Government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person" represents the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling
interest. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-1(b). The District Court granted the
preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the
Government's petition for certiorari. Before this Court, the Government's
central submission is that it has a compelling interest in the uniform
application of the Controlled Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban
on use of the hallucinogen can be made to accommodate the sect's sincere
religious practice. We conclude that the Government has not carried the burden
expressly placed on it by Congress in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and affirm the grant of the preliminary injunction.
I
In
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), this Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit governments from
burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws. In Smith,
we rejected a challenge to an
Congress
responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107
Stat. 1488, as amended, 42
The
Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21
O
Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniăo do Vegetal (UDV)
In
1999, United States Customs inspectors intercepted a shipment to the American
UDV containing three drums of hoasca. A subsequent investigation
revealed that the UDV had received 14 prior shipments of hoasca. The
inspectors seized the intercepted shipment and threatened the UDV with
prosecution.
The
UDV filed suit against the Attorney General and other federal law enforcement
officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged, inter
alia, that applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV's sacramental
use of hoasca violates RFRA. Prior to trial, the UDV moved for a
preliminary injunction, so that it could continue to practice its faith pending
trial on the merits.
At
a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the Government conceded that the
challenged application of the Controlled Substances Act would substantially
burden a sincere exercise of religion by the UDV. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft,
The
District Court heard evidence from both parties on the health risks of hoasca
and the potential for diversion from the church. The Government presented
evidence to the effect that use of hoasca, or DMT more generally, can
cause psychotic reactions, cardiac irregularities, and adverse drug
interactions. The UDV countered by citing studies documenting the safety of its
sacramental use of hoasca and presenting evidence that minimized the
likelihood of the health risks raised by the Government. With respect to diversion,
the Government pointed to a general rise in the illicit use of hallucinogens,
and cited interest in the illegal use of DMT and hoasca in particular;
the UDV emphasized the thinness of any market for hoasca, the
relatively small amounts of the substance imported by the church, and the
absence of any diversion problem in the past.
The
District Court concluded that the evidence on health risks was "in
equipoise," and similarly that the evidence on diversion was
"virtually balanced."
The
court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Government from
enforcing the Controlled Substances Act with respect to the UDV's importation
and use of hoasca. The injunction requires the church to import the
tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control over the tea to persons of
church authority, and to warn particularly susceptible UDV members of the
dangers of hoasca. See Preliminary Injunction ¶¶2, 5-12, 32-33, App. F
to App. to Pet. for Cert. 249a, 250a-252a, 258a-259a. The injunction also
provides that "if [the Government] believe[s] that evidence exists that hoasca
has negatively affected the health of UDV members," or "that a
shipment of hoasca contain[s] particularly dangerous levels of DMT,
[the Government] may apply to the Court for an expedited determination of
whether the evidence warrants suspension or revocation of [the UDV's authority
to use hoasca]."
The
Government appealed the preliminary injunction and a panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, O Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft,
II
Although
its briefs contain some discussion of the potential for harm and diversion from
the UDV's use of hoasca, the Government does not challenge the
District Court's factual findings or its conclusion that the evidence submitted
on these issues was evenly balanced. Instead, the Government maintains that
such evidentiary equipoise is an insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act. We review the
District Court's legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to
issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.
The
Government begins by invoking the well-established principle that the party
seeking pretrial relief bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of
success on the merits. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975). The Government argues that
the District Court lost sight of this principle in issuing the injunction based
on a mere tie in the evidentiary record.
A
majority of the en banc Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and so do we. Before
the District Court, the Government conceded the UDV's prima facie case under
RFRA. See
does not even rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence").
The
Government argues that, although it would bear the burden of demonstrating a
compelling interest as part of its affirmative defense at trial on the merits,
the UDV should have borne the burden of disproving the asserted compelling
interests at the hearing on the preliminary injunction. This argument is
foreclosed by our recent decision in Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 542
(2004). In Ashcroft, we affirmed the
grant of a preliminary injunction in a case where the Government had failed to
show a likelihood of success under the compelling interest test. We reasoned
that "[a]s the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question
of [the challenged Act's] constitutionality, respondents [the movants] must be
deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that respondents'
proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [enforcing the
Act]."
The Government attempts to limit the rule announced
in Ashcroft to content-based restrictions on speech, but the
distinction is unavailing. The fact that Ashcroft involved such a
restriction was the reason the Government had the burden of proof at trial
under the First Amendment, see id., at 665, but in no way affected the
Court's assessment of the consequences of having that burden for purposes of
the preliminary injunction. Here the burden is placed squarely on the
Government by RFRA rather than the First Amendment, see 42 U. S. C.
§§2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3), but the consequences are the same. Congress'
express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA
challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally
mandated applications of the test, including at the preliminary injunction
stage.
III
The Government's second line of argument rests on the
Controlled Substances Act itself. The Government contends that the Act's
description of Schedule I substances as having "a high potential for
abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States," and "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical
supervision," 21 U. S. C. §812(b)(1), by itself precludes any
consideration of individualized exceptions such as that sought by the UDV. The
Government goes on to argue that the regulatory regime established by the Act--a
"closed" system that prohibits all use of controlled substances
except as authorized by the Act itself, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 10)--"cannot function with its
necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial
exemptions." Brief for Petitioners 18. According to the Government, there
would be no way to cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and "the
public will misread" such exceptions as signaling that the substance at
issue is not harmful after all. Id., at 23. Under the Government's
view, there is no need to assess the particulars of the UDV's use or weigh the
impact of an exemption for that specific use, because the Controlled Substances
Act serves a compelling purpose and simply admits of no exceptions.
A
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted,
contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government's categorical approach.
RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test
is satisfied through application of the challenged law "to the
person"--the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is
being substantially burdened. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-1(b). RFRA
expressly adopted the compelling interest test "as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972)." 42 U. S. C. §2000bb(b)(1).
In each of those cases, this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests
justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants. In Yoder, for example, we permitted an exemption for Amish
children from a compulsory school attendance law. We recognized that the State
had a "paramount" interest in education, but held that "despite
its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine
the interests that the State seeks to promote ... and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."
406 U. S., at 213, 221 (emphasis added). The Court explained that the
State needed "to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong
interest ... would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the
Amish." Id., at 236 (emphasis added).
In Sherbert, the Court upheld a particular
claim to a religious exemption from a state law denying unemployment benefits
to those who would not work on Saturdays, but explained that it was not
announcing a constitutional right to unemployment benefits for "all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment." 374 U. S., at 410 (emphasis added). The Court distinguished the case "in which an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a
nonproductive member of society." Ibid.; see also Smith, 494 U. S., at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (strict
scrutiny "at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive
to the facts of each particular claim"). Outside the Free Exercise area as
well, the Court has noted that "[c]ontext matters" in applying the
compelling interest test, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327 (2003), and has emphasized that "strict
scrutiny does take 'relevant differences' into account--indeed, that
is its fundamental purpose," Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa,
515 U. S. 200, 228 (1995).
B
Under the more focused inquiry required by RFRA and
the compelling interest test, the Government's mere invocation of the general
characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in the Controlled
Substances Act, cannot carry the day. It is true, of course, that Schedule I
substances such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous. See, e.g., Touby
v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162 (1991). Nevertheless, there is no indication that
Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use
at issue here--the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca by the
UDV. The question of the harms from the sacramental use of hoasca by
the UDV was litigated below. Before the District Court found that the
Government had not carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in
preventing such harms, the court noted that it could not "ignore that the
legislative branch of the government elected to place materials containing DMT
on Schedule I of the [Act], reflecting findings that substances containing DMT
have 'a high potential for abuse,' and 'no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States,' and that '[t]here is a lack of accepted safety
for use of [DMT] under medical supervision.' " 282 F. Supp. 2d,
at 1254. But Congress' determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I
simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of
the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Controlled
Substances Act itself. The Act contains a provision authorizing the Attorney
General to "waive the requirement for registration of certain
manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the
public health and safety." 21 U. S. C. §822(d). The fact that
the Act itself contemplates that exempting certain people from its requirements
would be "consistent with the public health and safety" indicates
that congressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances should not
carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would
ascribe to them.
And in fact an exception has been made to the
Schedule I ban for religious use. For the past 35 years, there has been a
regulatory exemption for use of peyote--a Schedule I substance--by the Native
American Church. See 21 CFR §1307.31 (2005). In 1994, Congress extended that
exemption to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. See 42 U. S. C.
§1996a(b)(1). Everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca--that,
as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it "has a high
potential for abuse," "has no currently accepted medical use,"
and has "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical
supervision," 21 U. S. C. §812(b)(1)--applies in equal measure
to the mescaline in peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress itself have
decreed an exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious
use of peyote. If such use is permitted in the face of the congressional
findings in §812(b)(1) for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing
their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can preclude
any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of
the UDV who want to practice theirs. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547 (1993) ("It is established in our strict
scrutiny jurisprudence that 'a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest
'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly
vital interest unprohibited' " (quoting Florida Star v. B. J. F.,
491 U. S. 524, 541-542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment))).
The Government responds that there is a "unique
relationship" between the United States and the Tribes, Brief for
Petitioners 27; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974), but never explains what about that "unique" relationship justifies overriding the same congressional
findings on which the Government relies in resisting any exception for the
UDV's religious use of hoasca. In other words, if any Schedule I
substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter
how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing
their use of peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes
makes their members immune from the health risks the Government asserts
accompany any use of a Schedule I substance, nor insulates the Schedule I
substance the Tribes use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of
diversion.
The Government argues that the existence of a congressional
exemption for peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is
amenable to judicially crafted exceptions. RFRA, however, plainly
contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions--that is how the
law works. See 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-1(c) ("A person whose
religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government"). Congress' role in the peyote
exemption--and the Executive's, see 21 CFR §1307.31 (2005)--confirms that the
findings in the Controlled Substances Act do not preclude exceptions altogether;
RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether
exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.
C
The well-established peyote exception also fatally
undermines the Government's broader contention that the Controlled Substances
Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under
RFRA. The Government argues that the effectiveness of the Controlled Substances
Act will be "necessarily ... undercut" if the Act is not uniformly
applied, without regard to burdens on religious exercise. Brief for Petitioners
18. The peyote exception, however, has been in place since the outset of the
Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has
"undercut" the Government's ability to enforce the ban on peyote use
by non-Indians.
The Government points to some pre-Smith cases
relying on a need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause, see Brief for Petitioners 16, but those cases
strike us as quite different from the present one. Those cases did not embrace
the notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden
on religious exercise; they instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained
why the denied exemptions could not be accommodated. In United States
v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982), for example, the Court rejected a claimed
exception to the obligation to pay Social Security taxes, noting that "mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the
social security system" and that the "tax system could not function
if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments
were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief." Id.,
at 258, 260. See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 700 (1989) (same). In Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U. S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court denied a
claimed exception to Sunday closing laws, in part because allowing such
exceptions "might well provide [the claimants] with an economic advantage
over their competitors who must remain closed on that day." Id., at 608-609. The whole point of a "uniform day of rest for all
workers" would have been defeated by exceptions. See Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 408 (discussing Braunfeld). These cases show
that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform
application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the
requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to
administer the program.
Here the Government's argument for uniformity is
different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory program at issue as
on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim
for an exception to a generally applicable law. The Government's argument
echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an
exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions. But
RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test,
of exceptions to "rule[s] of general applicability." 42
U. S. C. §2000bb-1(a). Congress determined that the legislated test
"is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests." §200bb(a)(5). This
determination finds support in our cases; in Sherbert, for example, we
rejected a slippery-slope argument similar to the one offered in this case,
dismissing as "no more than a possibility" the State's speculation
"that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning
religious objections to Saturday work" would drain the unemployment
benefits fund. 374 U. S., at 407.
We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of
case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable
rules. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), we
held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
which allows federal and state prisoners to seek religious accommodations
pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA, does not violate the
Establishment Clause. We had "no cause to believe" that the
compelling interest test "would not be applied in an appropriately
balanced way" to specific claims for exemptions as they arose. Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 12). Nothing in our opinion suggested that courts were not
up to the task.
We do not doubt that there may be instances in which
a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally
applicable laws under RFRA. But it would have been surprising to find that this
was such a case, given the longstanding exemption from the Controlled
Substances Act for religious use of peyote, and the fact that the very reason
Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a claimed right to
sacramental use of a controlled substance. See 42 U. S. C.
§2000bb(a)(4). And in fact the Government has not offered evidence
demonstrating that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the kind of
administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in Lee, Hernandez,
and Braunfeld. The Government failed to convince the District Court at
the preliminary injunction hearing that health or diversion concerns provide a
compelling interest in banning the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca. It
cannot compensate for that failure now with the bold argument that there can be
no RFRA exceptions at all to the Controlled Substances Act. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 17 (Deputy Solicitor General statement that exception could not be made
even for "rigorously policed" use of "one drop" of
substance "once a year").
IV
Before the District Court, the Government also
asserted an interest in compliance with the 1971 United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, [1979-1980], 32 U. S. T. 543,
T. I. A. S. No. 9725. The Convention, signed by the United
States and implemented by the Controlled Substances Act, calls on signatories
to prohibit the use of hallucinogens, including DMT. The Government argues that
it has a compelling interest in meeting its international obligations by
complying with the Convention.
The District Court rejected this interest because it
found that the Convention does not cover hoasca. The court relied on
the official commentary to the Convention, which notes that "Schedule I
[of the Convention] does not list ... natural hallucinogenic materials,"
and that "[p]lants as such are not, and it is submitted are also not
likely to be, listed in Schedule I, but only some products obtained from
plants." U. N. Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances 387, 385 (1976). The court reasoned that hoasca, like the
plants from which the tea is made, is sufficiently distinct from DMT itself to
fall outside the treaty. See 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1266-1269.
We do not agree. The Convention provides that "a
preparation is subject to the same measures of control as the psychotropic
substance which it contains," and defines "preparation" as
"any solution or mixture, in whatever physical state, containing one or
more psychotropic substances." See 32 U. S. T., at 546, Art. 1(f)(i); id., at 551, Art. 3. Hoasca is a "solution or
mixture" containing DMT; the fact that it is made by the simple process of
brewing plants in water, as opposed to some more advanced method, does not
change that. To the extent the commentary suggests plants themselves are not
covered by the Convention, that is of no moment--the UDV seeks to import and
use a tea brewed from plants, not the plants themselves, and the tea plainly
qualifies as a "preparation" under the Convention.
The fact that hoasca is covered by the
Convention, however, does not automatically mean that the Government has
demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act,
which implements the Convention, to the UDV's sacramental use of the tea. At
the present stage, it suffices to observe that the Government did not even submit
evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for
the UDV. The Government simply submitted two affidavits by State Department
officials attesting to the general importance of honoring international
obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in
the international war on drugs. See Declaration of Gary T. Sheridan (Jan. 24,
2001), App. G to App. to Pet. for Cert. 261a; Declaration of Robert E. Dalton
(Jan. 24, 2001), App. H, id., at 265a. We do not doubt the validity of
these interests, any more than we doubt the general interest in promoting
public health and safety by enforcing the Controlled Substances Act, but under
RFRA invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough.2
* * *
The Government repeatedly invokes Congress' findings
and purposes underlying the Controlled Substances Act, but Congress had a
reason for enacting RFRA, too. Congress recognized that "laws 'neutral'
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise," and legislated "the compelling
interest test" as the means for the courts to "strik[e] sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests." 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb(a)(2), (5).
We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by
Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one. Indeed, the very sort of
difficulties highlighted by the Government here were cited by this Court in
deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not
required as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause. See Smith,
494 U. S., at 885-890. But Congress has determined that courts should
strike sensible balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires
the Government to address the particular practice at issue. Applying that test,
we conclude that the courts below did not err in determining that the
Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a
compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so
ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1
As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States
as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U. S. 507 (1997), we held the application to States to be
beyond Congress' legislative authority under §5 of the 14th Amendment.
Footnote 2
In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the
UDV's argument that Art. 22, ¶5, of the Convention should be read to
accommodate exceptions under domestic laws such as RFRA.